two subject peoples striving for national f r e e d~m .~ This linkage of Irish and Indian history has had particular resonance in Bengal. Although the rise of the revolutionary terrorist movement in Bengal preceded the Easter Rising by more than a decade, after the First World War Ireland became the most important model for physical-force nationalists in the province. Both Bengali nationalists and British administrators drew comparisons between Irish resistance to the British Empire and contemporary terrorist activity in Bengal. For the former group, the Irish experience provided a heroic model of anticolonial resistance, as well as what seemed to be a blueprint for national liberation. For the British officers involved in countering terrorism in Bengal, however, the British experience in Ireland offered a wealth of strategies to apply-or avoid-as well as a way of understanding the "terrorist mentality." This article explores the ways in which the Anglo-Irish conflict, and Ireland and "Irishness" in a broader sense, were seen to be relevant to both the proponents of revolutionary terrorism in Bengal and those responsible for policing it. These linkages between Ireland and India were far from the first made by both Indian nationalists and the British colonial administrators. There were, however, new types of comparisons made after 1921 that linked Ireland and India to a greater degree than before as "oppressed peoples" of the British Empire. After the episode of Irish "decolonization" in 1921, the experience of Ireland had special resonance as the first example of "successful" rebellion against the British Empire.
Bengali admiration for Irish nationalism and emulation of Irish tactics are significant for students of both Indian history and British imperialism. First, they demonstrate the regional variation of Indian nationalism and how Bengali nationalism, with its prominent focus on physical force, differed from what is commonly thought of as the mainstream (based on Gandhi's doctrines of nonviolence). The recent analyses of Indian nationalism by Partha Chatterjee have projected a monolithic conception of Indian nationalism, in which colonial nationalism "seeks to replace the structures of colonial power with a new order, that of national p~w e r . "Ĩn Chatterjee's formulation, there is little alternative but for the nationalism of a colonial society to lead to a monolithic nation-state; there is no alternative to an "all-India" nationalism. But as critics have observed, this analysis downplays the extent to which alternative visions of the nation-state were formulated during the Indian "freedom movement," particularly around regional and linguistic lines.4 The Bengali reception of Irish nationalism calls attention to the distinctiveness of nationalism in Bengal and, more generally, to the significant linkages that obtained among far-flung nationalist groups within the British Empire.
Gandhi has been taken to represent the views of Indian nationalists as a whole on this issue. The Mahatma, while admiring the goals of Sinn FCin, condemned their methods and compared them to General Dyer, the perpetrator of the Amritsar massacre. Indian noncooperation, Gandhi wrote in 1920, in contrast to Sinn FCin agitation in Ireland, depended for its success on nonviolence. "The Sinn FCiners resort to violence in every shape and form. Theirs is a 'frightfulness' not unlike General Dyer's," he argued. "We may pardon it if we choose, because we sympathize with their cause. But it does not on that account differ in quality from General Dyer's act."' Historians have generally taken the comments of Gandhi to mean that the physical-force variety of Irish nationalism had no impact in India after 1921.6 The experience of Bengal, however, indicates the importance of European nationalist movements and Irish nationalism, in particular, for colonial nationalist movements within the British Empire. This borrowing from the Western world was an eclectic process in which ideas and ideologies were not taken wholesale but adapted in differing degrees.
In this context, Indian nationalist sympathy for Ireland was not fortuitous. Historians have emphasized Ireland's anomalous status in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as both an "imperial" and a "coloChatterjee identifies three stages of the colonial nationalist encounter with the West. By the last of these stages, "the moment of arrival," he argues that nationalist thought has become a "discourse of order" and "the rational organization of power." Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought ti Keith Jeffery, e.g., argues that "in India . . . the Irish model of guerilla warfare that developed in 1919-21 was not followed." See his "Introduction," in Jeffrey, ed., An Irish Empire? p. 9.
nial" part of the empires7 One important factor in this liminal position was the role of Irishmen as servants of the British E m~i r e .~ As a part of the United Kingdom during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Ireland's experience was equivalent to neither the white "colonies of settlement" nor the nonwhite colonies of Africa or Asia. The issue of race further complicated Ireland's dual role as colony and colonial power. Although the Irish were sometimes ranked with the nonwhite races of the world in Victorian racial discourse, within the colonial context, the Irish undoubtedly ranked as colonial rna~ters.~ From the perspective of nineteenth-century Irish nationalists, however, Ireland was a conquered and subject nation, closer to India and the colonial empire rather than to Australia or Canada.'' As lingering Indian suspicions of the Irish as both imperial servants and a "white and Christian race" eroded in the aftermath of the First World War, these contradictory Irish identities allowed Indian-and especially Bengali-nationalists to embrace the Irish as a fellow "subject race."
In the late nineteenth century, Irish and Indian nationalist leaders shared to varying degrees romanticized notions of a common struggle against the British Empire." At least some Irish nationalists encouraged Ibid In addition to direct contacts between nationalist leaders, the Indian press, which rapidly expanded from the 1870s, included ample coverage of Irish affairs, particularly in the eventful decade of the 1880s. The agrarian agitation of the Land War elicited a decidedly mixed reaction from Indian educated opinion, with the more conservative segments appalled but the more liberal sections issuing calls for the mobilization of the Indian peasantry. Certainly, the boast of the Bengalee newspaper of Calcutta that Parnell's cry of "No Rent" echoed through the "wide length of Bengal" was a tremendous exaggeration. As H. V. Brasted has argued, "Nationalism, as revealed by Ireland, was always regarded as a model as much to avoid as to emulate. Instead of an inflexibly designed blueprint, Ireland presented an agenda for debate and supplied a frame of reference that permitted India to define its own attitudes to British rule."14 One obstacle to Indian emulation of Irish tactics was the perceived racial difference between the Irish and the Indians. While the racialist beliefs of some Victorians branded Celtic races such as the Irish as inferior, and some Irish revolutionaries claimed that Indians shared a com- First, the connections demonstrate the interaction of geographically diverse nationalist movements at a time when the British Empire was at its greatest extent but was subject to considerable internal pressures. Bengal demonstrates that these contacts concerned not merely mass nationalist movements but armed resistance to the British Empire. In Bengal the mass nationalism of the Indian National Congress combined with the revolutionary activities of a number of groups to create a considerable public order dilemma for the colonial state. In 1932, King George V, in apparent bafflement, pleaded with the provincial governor to answer the question "What is wrong with Benga1?"25
Second, Bengal provides a striking example of how Ireland continued to influence events in the British Empire after 1922. The reception of Irish nationalism in Bengal illustrates both the multiplicity of Indian "nationalisms" as well as the changing meaning of "Irishness" within the British Empire. To Bengali nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s, who were ambivalent about Gandhi and the efficacy of nonviolent nationalist methods and already committed to violence as a means of achieving Indian independence, Ireland represented a successful model of armed re-sistance to the British Empire that could be studied and duplicated. To British observers, the events in Ireland also held out potential ways to neutralize the "terrorist" threat in Bengal. To understand fully the impact of Ireland on events in India during the interwar period, we need to move from an all-India picture to examine events in the province of Bengal.
Nationalism in Bengal differed in many respects from what is generally regarded as the mainstream of Indian nationalism, based on Gandhi's doctrines of nonviolence (ahimsa). In particular, the sympathy of large numbers of middle-class Bengali nationalists for armed resistance to British rule distinguished them from the predominant attitudes of the Indian National C o n g r e~s .~~ To be sure, revolutionary movements were active in other parts of India, but in the British view, Bengal was "the home and breeding ground of t e r r o r i~m . "~~ The revolutionary movement in Bengal was rooted in the bhadralok, or educated Hindu middle classes, and was in large part a response to the racism of colonial rule. In Bengal, where British commercial interests had a particularly entrenched grip on power, stereotypes portrayed Bengalis-and particularly the bhadralok-as weak and effeminate. By the end of the nineteenth century a well-established physical culture movement among middle-class youth had sought to counter the British stereotype of Bengali "effetenes~."~~ This physical culture movement in turn became the basis for revolutionary terrorism in Bengal. In 1902 a revolutionary group named the Anushilan Samiti, or "cultural society," emerged in Calcutta, becoming the model for all later Bengali revolutionary organizations. Secret societies sprang up elsewhere in Bengal at this time but achieved little until the combined effect of the 1905 Partition 26 There is no satisfactory synthesis of revolutionary terrorism in Bengal, but among the studies treating terrorism in Bengal from various perspectives are Hiren Chakrabarti, Political Protest in Bengal: Boycott and Terrorism, 1905 -1918 (Calcutta, 1992 of Bengal and the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War spurred interest in revolutionary a~tivity.~'
The terrorist movement in Bengal was never numerically large and was limited almost exclusively to the b h a d r~l o k .~~ Yet, in spite of the limited segments of Bengali society who were attracted to terrorism, the movement was considered a great threat to British rule in Bengal. Prior to the passage in 1915 of the Defence of India Act, which allowed for the detention of revolutionary suspects without trial, the Bengal terrorist campaign almost completely disrupted the province's administrati~n.~' From 1906 until 1935, the Bengal Police Intelligence Branch recorded a total of over five hundred "revolutionary crimes" involving terrorists and estimated that another two hundred incidents of theft or disappearance of arms or ammunition occurred in the same period. "Terrorist" incidents occurred every year from 1908 to 1947 in Benga1.32 In the early 1930s, revolutionaries carried out a series of assassinations whose victims included the inspector general of the Bengal police and three successive district magistrates in Midnapore District, as well as an attack on the Writer's Building, the seat of the Bengal government in Calcutta.
After a general amnesty issued in December 1919 for those imprisoned for terrorist offenses during the First World War, large numbers of former revolutionaries reestablished their organizations. By the mid1920s, traditionally considered a quiet period for Indian nationalism, Bengali revolutionaries had revived their campaign of political dacoities, or gang robberies, assassinations, and plans for general risings. By the end of the decade, leaders of different terrorist groups were no longer able to contain the demands of younger members for action against the Raj, and assassination attempts on British and Bengali representatives of the colonial state began to increase. From 1930 to 1934, revolutionaries assassinated nine British officials, including the inspector general of police, and their activities were suppressed only when British and Indian army units were stationed in a number of districts. By the mid-1930s, 29 Ray, Social Conjict and Political Unrest, p. 141. 30 According to the Rowlatt Committee (1918), 89 percent of the 186 persons killed or convicted of "revolutionary crimes" in Bengal from 1907 to 1917 belonged to the three chief bhadralok castes of Brahmin, Kayastha, or Baidya. The largest single occupation listed for the terrorists was "student," while a significant number were professionals such as teachers or in government service. Heehs however, the attraction of terrorism for those who had been its principal supporters, the middle-class Hindu youth of Bengal, began to wane. Marxism, which encouraged action based on mass organization and preparation for proletarian revolution, attracted many of the former terrorists of Bengal. At the same time, the extensive use of police and military forces by the colonial state and the constitutional reforms of the 1935 Government of India Act combined to blunt Bengali support for the revol~t i o n a r i e s .~~ In Bengal, the line between the mass agitation of the Indian National Congress and the clandestine activities of revolutionaries was a narrow one. Until the mid-1930s, the revolutionary terrorist movement in Bengal enjoyed the sympathy of broad segments of the bhadralok p~p u l a t i o n .~~ The first revolutiona~y organizations drew their support from many of the samitis, or societies, which were set up during the Swadeshi movement in protest of the 1905 Partition of Bengal. After the 1919 amnesty, large numbers of former revolutionaries reestablished their organizations under the cover of Gandhi's noncooperation movement. Many former terrorists became organizers of noncooperation activities, and, according to an Intelligence Branch report, they "recruited many of the volunteers as terr o r i s t~. "~Terrorist groups also found a fertile recruiting ground in Gandhi's civil disobedience campaign, which began in 1930.
This connection to revolutionary activity extended to the leadership of the Congress Party in Bengal as well. Surya Sen, a leader of the revolutionary Jugantar Party, had also been a member of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee, while Surendra Mohan Ghose was both a member of Jugantar and the president of the Bengal C~n g r e s s .~~ C. R.
Das's Swaraj Party also was closely allied with cells of the two main Bengali revolutionary groups, Jugantar and the Anushilan Samiti, and a number of leaders from both groups held important positions within the Swaraj Party. At least twenty-eight Bengalis convicted or detained for terrorist offenses held offices in the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee in 1924, and twenty-one Bengali revolutionaries were elected to the 33 The conversion of many former Bengal terrorists to Marxism is the subject of Laushey, Bengal Terrorism and the Marxist Left.
34 Rajat Kanta Ray writes, "In the grim battle between the police and the revolutionaries, the sympathy of large sections of Bengali society lay with the latter." Ray All-India Congress Committee in the same year.37 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Jugantar Party was closely linked with Congress leader Subhas Chandra B o~e .~~ From the beginning, British officials almost unanimously considered the Bengali "terrorist" movement to be patterned after European nihilism and anarchism. Here, British stereotypes of Bengalis as unthinking imitators of Western culture were used to explain the rise of revolutionary societies. One of the most influential proponents of this view was The Times correspondent Valentine Chirol, who argued that Bengalis were "of all Indians the most slavish imitators of the West, as represented, at any rate, by the Irish Fenians and the Russian a n a r c h i~t . "~~ In 1908, the inspector general of police of the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam wrote of wild rumors of contacts between Bengali and foreign revolutionaries, including gunrunning by German steamers and reports of "nondescript foreigners strolling about this country." He concluded his report by requesting the assistance of a Scotland Yard police officer experienced in dealing with European anarchists and terrorist^.^^ In spite of the readily available indigenous inspirations for armed resistance to British rule, Bengali revolutionaries did in fact owe an enormous intellectual debt to European techniques of rev~lution.~' Prior to 1916, however, direct influences on revolutionary tactics came largely from Continental rather than Irish sources. Bengali revolutionaries learned techniques of bomb making from anarchists in Paris and copied the organization of secret cells of Russian revolutionary organizations. While Bengalis regarded Irish nationalism with sympathy as "the nationalism of subject people," its relatively quiescent and constitutional nature in the decades before the First World War meant that it provided a poor example of a nation gaining freedom through armed struggle.42 37 By the 1920s, however, the relative indifference of Bengali nationalists and revolutionaries to events in Ireland had changed dramatically. In 1926 the Daily Mail's correspondent in Calcutta reported that "Ireland has furnished the inspiration for the revolutionary movement in Bengal. Nothing interests the Bengali so much as the story of the rising against Dublin Castle, with its attendant ambuscades, assassinations, and street fighting. Nearly all the literature dealing with the campaign of Michael Collins and his followers has been translated into the vernacular and is sold in native bookshops. The Bengali believes that if he adopts the same methods as the Irish Republicans he will achieve at least as great a measure of self-g~vernment."~~ Similarly, the writer and critic Nirad C. Chaudhuri, who was intensely critical of the terrorist movement, noted the attraction of Sinn FCin for Bengali nationalists after the Anglo-Irish War. "The success of the Irish in securing independence for their country by this method made them think that they too would succeed," Chaudhuri wrote of the Bengali revolutionaries. The Bengalis, he concluded, "thought they were the Sinn F6in of India."44 In 1935 Subhas Chandra Bose wrote to the secretary of the Irish-Indian Independence League that "in my part of the country (Bengal), recent Irish history is studied closely by freedom-loving men and women and several Irish characters are literally worshipped in many a home."" Bose himself traveled to Ireland in 1936 and met three times with de Valera, who received him "as something like an 'envoy' of a friendly nation," as well as with other members of Fianna Fhil and opposition members of Sinn F6in. 46 The frustration of mostly Hindu, middle-class Bengalis at the inability to enlist the largely Muslim population of the province in the nationalist struggle also played an important part in popularizing Irish nationalism in Bengal. The problem of mass mobilization of a majority Muslim populace by the nationalist movement's largely Hindu, middle-class politicians in the face of concerted opposition by European commercial interests left Bengali bhadralok increasingly frustrated by legal constitutionalism and disposed to violent resistance or communal ideologies. As Rajat Kanta Ray has noted, nationalists were ready "to try any variant of political extremism based on a narrow social basis." In this "psychopathological atmosphere of cruelty, suspicion and treachery," Ireland was seized upon as a model of anticolonial resistance to the hated British Empire.47 In contrast to North Indian terrorist organizations such as the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, whose goal was the "death knell of capitalism," the ideology of Bengal terrorism focused not on social revolution but on "courageous martyrdom" and the overthrow of the ''blood-thirsty English." 48 Increasingly, by the late 1920s, the younger men of revolutionary parties began to push for immediate action against the British, rather than a patient campaign involving the collection of arms and the commission of dacoities to accumulate funds. Many of these younger revolutionaries were admirers of the Irish example. The vehemently anti-British tone of Irish nationalism held great attraction for radical Bengali nationalists, while the writings of Irish nationalists provided a further intellectual justification for the idea of physical force. In particular, both the "selfsacrificial idealist" Patrick Pearse and the "pragmatic rebel" Dan Breen provided models for Bengali terrorists in the 1920s and 1930s, as Bengali revolutionaries attempted to employ the practical tactics of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), while at the same time displaying a willingness to sacrifice themselves in the service of the m~t h e r l a n d .~~
In this period, Bengali nationalist leaders assimilated Irish Republican leaders into the canon of nationalist heroes fighting against the British Empire and embraced the Irish themselves as a fellow subject race. The greatest recipient of nationalist acclaim was Eamon de Valera. While Michael Collins was lauded as a master strategist of guerilla warfare and intelligence operations, de Valera was praised as a nation builder. One Bengali writer referred to Ireland as de Valera's "handmade nation," and in 1923 a Bengali-language newspaper esteemed de Valera, Gandhi, and the Egyptian nationalist leader Zaghul Pasha as the three greatest popular leaders of anti-imperial ~truggle.~' Numerous serialized accounts of the life of de Valera were published in the 1920s in newspapers both in Calcutta and in the hinterland. The parallel between Ireland and India as "colonial" peoples included a presumption of general Irish sympathy for all forms of resistance to the British Empire. The "Irish jailor" who was sympathetic to imprisoned revolutionaries became a stock figure in the memoirs and recollections of Bengali nati~nalists.'~ Surendra Mohan Ghose recalled two Irish jail superintendents in Burma and Madras who had "some sort of sympathy for this kind of [revolutionary] political prisoner" and "believed that we were unnecessarily persecuted because of political views."'' While in Ireland, Subhas Bose had a cordial meeting with the former officer in charge of Mandalay Jail, where he had been detained in the previous decade. According to the Fianna FBil newspaper, the Irish Press, "the two men had a talk and exchanged views on their last meeting in different circumstances." 56 In a more practical sense, Bengalis believed that the experiences of Irish nationalists provided a blueprint for liberation from British rule. The Irish republicans offered to Bengal a tradition of heroic martyrdom to add to the ranks of Bengali revolutionaries who had already died in the campaign against the British. A famous revolutionary leaflet seized by the Bengal police in 1929 quoted Patrick Pearse and urged Bengalis to imitate his sacrifice: "This is how a nation awakes. Flare up with the fire of vengeance for the annihilation of foreign enemies. You will find that the victory is yours. History bears testimony to this. Read and learn the history of Pearse-the gem of young Ireland-and you will find how noble is his sacrifice; how he stimulated new animation in the nation, being mad over independence. . . . Pearse died and by so dying he roused in the heart of the nation an indomitable desire for armed revolution. Who will deny this truth?"57 A more direct link was the imitation of Terence MacSwiney, the Lord Mayor of Cork who fasted to death in 1920, by the Bengali revolutionary Jatindranath Das, who died while on a hunger strike in Lahore Jail in 1929. According to Nirad C. Chaudhuri, ''MacSwiney was almost worshipped by politically conscious Bengalis," and the mayor of Calcutta sent a message to MacSwiney7s widow in which he stated that "Terence MacSwiney showed the way to Ireland's freedom. Jatin Das has followed him." In 1940, Subhas Chandra Bose wrote that he was inspired by "the classic and immortal examples of Terence MacSwiney and Jatin Das" in beginning a hunger strike to protest his detention by the Government of BengaL5* Probably the greatest single Irish inspiration for Bengali revolutionaries, however, was Dan Breen ' On the night of 18 April, three groups of more than sixty revolutionaries armed with revolvers and pistols captured and set fire to police and auxiliary force armories in Chittagong and seized arms and ammunition, while others destroyed rail and telegraph communications. After a brief battle with police, in which nineteen of the revolutionaries were killed, they were forced to retreat into the jungle surrounding the town. A number of those involved in the raid, including their leader, Surya Sen, remained at large for three years and were only captured through the use of British and Indian Army battalions to carry out search operations in the district.68
The Chittagong Armoury Raid, the largest and most effective revolutionary action ever mounted by the Bengali revolutionaries, occurred in the middle of the Congress Party's civil disobedience campaign. The raid created a boom in recruitment for revolutionary organizations and sparked British fears of similar raids elsewhere. According to the Bengal Police Intelligence Branch, "When the truth was known the effect was electric, and from that moment the outlook of the Bengali terrorists changed. The younger members of all parties, whose heads were already crammed with ideas of driving the British out of India by force of arms . . . clamoured for a change to emulate the Chittagong terrorists.'"j9
The Irish inspiration for the action was acknowledged by both British and Indian observers. The members of Jugantar who carried out the attack afterward distributed leaflets signed by the "Indian Republican Army, Chittagong Branch," a name clearly modeled after the Irish Republican Army.70 According to Bhupati Mazumdar, a revolutionary and secretary of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee in 1922-23, the revolutionaries responsible for the Chittagong raid became "impatient" because "they read that Irish rebel Dan Breen's book." One participant in the raid, Lokenath Bal, later wrote, "the blood-stained memory of the Easter Revolution of the IRA [sic] touched our young minds with fiery enthu~iasm!"~' In the immediate aftermath of the raid, police searches found evidence that "the present rising has been based on the Irish Re- Fightfor Irish Freedom "might aptly be described as 'The Revolutionaries' Manual' " and that the Chittagong Raiders were "thoroughly conversant" with it: "The book throughout extols armed rebellion against constituted authority and is written in such a way as to win the sympathies of young emotional minds for the spirit of revolt. . . . Dan Breen's book is held up as a text book for the revolutionaries of India. . . . The action of the revolutionaries was largely inspired by this book and that their plan of operations was based on its lessons." 73 The Chittagong Armoury Raid demonstrates how Bengali revolutionaries were inspired by both the Easter Rising and the guerilla tactics of the Irish Republican Army as depicted by Dan Breen. More generally, Breen's tales of IRA exploits inspired Bengali revolutionaries to draw up ambitious plans for cutting telegraph lines, blowing up bridges and railway lines, and disabling the electricity supply of C a l~u t t a .~~ The Easter Rising was especially influential in promoting the idea of martyrdom as a means of obtaining national freedom. Ganesh Ghosh, one of the leaders of the raid, later recalled the preparations for the rising as "a programme of death." "The main object," he wrote, "was not to attempt to free the whole of India or the province of Bengal, but to set an example before the countrymen, particularly the youths and the students, and demoralise the British imperialist^."^^ Surya Sen himself often quoted the words of the Irish Fenian leader Fintan Lalor that "somewhere, somehow and by somebody a beginning must be made and the first act of resistance is always and shall ever be premature, imprudent, unwise and d a n g e r o u~. "~~ As Kalpana Dutt observed in her memoirs, "They knew that a handful of revolutionaries cannot destroy the British government. But they had the conviction that even a handful of revolutionaries with a properly planned programme and determination could give a severe blow to British admini~tration."~~ British officials involved with the policing of the terrorist movement in Bengal had been aware well before 1930 of the connection Bengali nationalist revolutionaries made with the Irish nationalist movement. After the Anglo-Irish War, police intelligence reports featured a new description for the tactics of Bengali revolutionaries: ''Sinn F6in" methods. "The attack on Government has been definitely organized on Sinn F6in lines," stated a 1924 police intelligence report. "Local administration is to be captured and controlled by revolutionary organizations throughout the province and Government officials terrorized by a campaign of assas~ination."'~ Two years later the Bengal Police Intelligence Branch reported that a secret section of the Labour Swaraj Party had a program "to smuggle arms from the Far East and to work on Sinn FCin lines in India." In British eyes, any attempt to combine armed resistance with mass agitation became known as "Sinn FCin" tactics.79
The Bengal Police Intelligence Branch regarded the Bengal revolutionaries' infatuation with Irish revolutionary methods as an accurate predictor of future revolutionary action. The "Irish gunman," recalled one former Bengal police officer, was "regarded as an example to copy."80 Two English policemen, both former heads of the Bengal Police Intelligence Branch, resigned in 1921-22, citing their fear of "an intensive campaign on the lines of Sinn FCin." One of the officers wrote that "it is the declared aim of the extremists to cause this development to follow on Sinn FCin lines," which he feared would be in large part directed at the Bengal police. 81 Bengal policemen and civil servants cited Dan Breen as an authority nearly as often as did the Bengali revolutionaries. My Fight for Irish Freedom was seen by British observers as providing insight into the "terrorist mentality." A Government of India intelligence report noted that in 1929 "a new amalgamated party" had been formed in Bengal "for immediate terrorism based on the methods, such as surprise attacks on armed police posts, and guerilla warfare, as described in Dan Breen's My Fight for Irish Freedom." In the aftermath of the Chittagong Armoury Raid, a British police officer reported that individual members of the revolutionary groups were acting independently of their leaders "just as Dan Breen and his desperadoes acted independently of the recognized leaders of the Irish Independent Party
In an attempt to counter the influence of "Sinn Fiin" ideology on Bengali nationalists, the Government of India attempted to ban literature dealing with Ireland, which, in their view, had revolutionary implicat i o n~.~The proscription of Irish materials began even before the First World War with the banning of the Irish-American nationalist paper the Gaelic American, which circulated widely among nationalists in Bengal as well as elsewhere in India.84 In arguing for the ban, the Director of Criminal Intelligence, C. J. Stevenson-Moore, observed that "this paper makes a point of linlung Ireland and India together as two down-trodden countries struggling for freedom. All its utterances are marked by violent and deep-rooted hatred for British rule and are a direct incitement to natives of this country to struggle or intrigue in order to overthrow it."
After the Easter Rising, the Government of India was especially concerned to monitor news from Ireland. Reports of nationalist opposition to conscription in Ireland, for example, were censored in April 1918 because the Home Department felt that such news would be "a great encouragement" to the Indian Home Rule movement.86 Until the end of the Anglo-Irish War, the proscription of seditious materials relating to 84 Forty copies of the Gaelic American were seized in the French enclave of Chandernagore, near Calcutta, in December 1907, addressed to one S. N. Sen. After the proscription of the paper, Sen "apparently at the instigation" of Bengali revolutionaries based in Chandernagore, sought to obtain copies for over seventy other subscribers, mostly newspaper editors in Calcutta and the mofussil, through the French postal service. C. A. Tegart, "Note on the Chandernagore Gang," 20 July 1913, WBSA, GOB Home (Pol.) Conf. no. 342 of 1913.
Note by C. J. Stevenson-Moore, 11 July 1907, NAI, GO1 Home (Pol.) A, August 1907, 243-50. In July 1907 orders were given for postal officials to surreptitiously seize copies of the paper; 335 copies of the Gaelic American had been seized before it was formally proscribed under the Sea Customs Act in September 1907; NAI, GO1 Home (Pol.) A, January 1908, 38-42. 86 Davis, "The Influence of the Irish Revolution on Indian Nationalism," p. to allow it entry into this country would be, in my opinion, really danger-O U S . "~The book, he concluded, was "a most dangerous recruiting weapon in the hands of revolutionary organizers" and "inherently just as dangerous as Dan Breen's." The director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India, Horace Williamson, agreed that the book should be banned, arguing that "in practically every instance I have found that the very beginning of their initiation into terrorism has been caused by their being given exciting books such as My Fight for Irish Freedom to read."91 The matter was eventually referred to the governor of Bengal, Sir John Anderson. Anderson agreed that it was "unquestionable" that the book would do harm if widely read but that its author, unlike Breen, did not "represent the individual terrorist as a heroic and romantic figure." Anderson doubted that the message that terrorism "may force England to her knees" would "at this time of day . . . cut much ice in India." The government eventually decided that proscription would give undue attention to the book, and it was in consequence not banned.92
The efforts of the British in Bengal to combat Bengali terrorism were not limited to the proscription of literature by or about Irish revolutionaries and nationalists, however. In the formulation of legal and administrative measures to combat terrorism, the Government of Bengal looked first to the experience of the Irish Free State in dealing with militant members of the IRA after 1922 and later, after the appointment of Sir John Anderson as governor in 1932, to the British experience in the Anglo-Irish War.
This strategy marked a shift in the British understanding of the relationship of Ireland to India in particular and the empire in general. In the nineteenth century, Ireland had been a fertile source of precedents for the British Empire in two major areas: land tenure and law and order. In the former case, a greater concern for the concept of the rights of tenantry influenced legislation in both countries. Indian land legislation provided the precedent for the Land Act of 1870 in Ireland, while the Irish Land Act of 1881 in turn provided the basis for the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885.93 In terms of issues of law and order, specific legislation to combat nationalist movements in India was based upon similar measures enacted in Ireland.94 More generally, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) exerted a profound influence on the development of policing in India, as well as elsewhere in the empire. The RIC was regarded as an ideal of what colonial policing ought to be, and the reorganization of the Indian police in the aftermath of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 replicated the centralized control and semimilitary aspects of the Irish Constabulary.
After the disbandment of the RIC in 1921, large numbers of its officers, as well as auxiliary forces raised during the Anglo-Irish War, were recruited for service elsewhere in the empire. 95 In 1922, the India Office made an abortive attempt to secure places for demobilized members of the RIC in India. As Malcolm Seton of the India Office remarked, members of the RIC "a drilled, semi-military force," were considered "tactful-and painfully experienced-in handling crowds. . . . In a place like Calcutta, the men should do very well indeed after a short training."96 In the end, however, few members of the RIC were tempted by the prospect of Indian service after the British government awarded them a generous pension. 97 The British attempt to recruit members of the RIC for the Indian police focused on the "regular" recruits of the constabulary; the India Office specifically tried to avoid recruiting members of the RIC's Auxiliary Division or the "Black and Tans" for service in India, for fear of inflaming nationalist opinion.98 By later in the decade, however, the lessons that the British began to absorb from Ireland were not those of "normal" police techniques of crowd control but of "abnormal" con-flict: the suppression of terrorism and the development of counterinsurgency techniques. In the development of British ideas about how best to combat insurgency, Ireland played a crucial role.99
The initial interest of British officials in the relevance of Ireland to the policing of terrorism in Bengal, however, came from the experience of the Irish Free State. Republican opposition to the Irish Free State government established in 1922 over the twenty-six counties of "southern" Ireland continued after the end of the Civil War of 1922-23 and necessitated a series of "public safety" laws.Io0 By the 1930s, Government of India officials had become thoroughly conversant with this legislation. While considering a bill proposed by the Government of Bengal to try terrorist offenders by military courts in 1932, for example, the Government of India noted its similarity to the Irish Free State Public Safety Act of 1927."' The Irish legislation that attracted the most attention, however, was a 1931 amendment to the Free State's Constitution that established military tribunals to try offenses without reference to any court of appeal. The tribunals were not limited by penalties fixed by the law but were empowered to impose "any greater punishment (including the penalty of death) if in the opinion of the Tribunal such greater punishment" was "necessary or expedient.'' The police were also given extensive powers of search and preventative detention.lo2
This act was regarded by British observers in India as a useful example of how to counter acts of terrorism.lo3 Malcolm Seton wrote, "This remarkable act is worth perusal. If its terms were known in India, the Indian public would begin to understand what 'zulum' [repression] really y9 According to Thomas Mockaitis, the Anglo-Irish War was "part of a long series of internal-security operations that collectively gave rise to a traditional wisdom on how to combat irregulars." Thomas Mockaitis, British Counter-insurgency, 1919 -1960 (London, 1990 , p. 12.
loo These began with the Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act of 1 August 1923 and extended to the Offenses against the State Act of 1939.
Io1See NAI, GO1 Home (Pol.) no. 4/66 of 1932. The 1927 Public Safety Act, passed after the assassination of Minister for Justice and External Affairs Kevin O'Higgins by an IRA gunman, provided for the establishment of "Special Courts" consisting of three or more members. The courts were established to try a range of offenses including murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to murder the governor-general of Ireland or any member of the Irish legislature or judges. There was no appeal from the tribunals' decisions.
lo2 Suspects had to be brought before tribunals within one month and three days of arrest. The India Office noted that "the powers of detention are not so great" as those in India, although "the reasons justifying detention without trial in India do not however exist in Ireland in virtue of the power of the Tribunal to order its procedure." Note by W. Johnston, 26 October 1931, OIOC, L/P&J/7/235.
Io3 British legislation to combat terrorism in India was based largely on the Defence of India Act of 1915, which allowed for detention without trial and the trial of terrorist suspects by tribunal rather than by jury. After his tour of duty in Ireland, Anderson served as permanent undersecretary of the Home Office, where, in his own words, he was "for ten years responsible for internal intelligence in Great Britain." log British observers believed that Anderson was uniquely talented to deal with terrorism in Bengal due to his experience in Ireland. Lionel Curtis wrote to Anderson that "everyone believes that you, better than any other Englishman, with your long experience at the Home Office and in Ireland will be able to grapple with the disorders in Bengal and suppress the terrorists." 'lo Other observers drew parallels between Bengal and Ireland but were less optimistic. During a visit to Bengal in March 1932 the Marquis of Lothian informed Anderson that the situation he would encounter in Bengal was not radically different from that which he had faced while at Dublin Castle. Lothian wrote that the Bengali revolutionaries possessed a "theatrical and pathological attitude, a state not unlike the state of Ireland before and after the Treaty." Sir Nevi1 Macready, former commander-in-chief in Ireland during Anderson's tenure, wrote that he could not congratulate Anderson on the appointment, "for I fear it may prove a dirty job, not unlike our penance in Ireland."lll More significant, Anderson himself made frequent reference to his Irish experience while he served as governor of Bengal.ll2 Anderson referred to the (Better) Government of Ireland Act (1920), for example, as a model for financial and constitutional relations between the Government of India and the provinces.l13 Nor was his use of his Irish experience limited to legislative analogies, for he also deployed it in the development of policies to counter terrorism, which he clearly considered to be his brief in Bengal.lI4 As governor, Anderson sought to counter terrorism in two ways that illustrate the complex interaction between British understanding of the Irish and Bengali situations: the consideration of legal measures against terrorism and the development of combined civil-military policies.
After Anderson's arrival, the Government of Bengal began to investigate whether legislation from the Anglo-Irish War might serve as a possible solution for the "terrorist menace" in Bengal.l15 In September 1932, the Government of Bengal submitted the "Trial of Terrorist Offenses Bill" to the Government of India. The legislation, based largely on the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act of 1920, was an attempt to allow military tribunals to try certain terrorist offenses under three broad headings of "waging war against the king," murder, and dacoity. While the chief secretary, R. N. Reid, noted that "the Irish analogy does not exactly cover the case" since there had been no "complete breakdown" of law and order in Bengal, the court-martial provision was applicable and would provide a "stiffening" of tribunals under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act."6 In arguing in its favor, Anderson stressed that this method had "worked well" in Ireland. If the civil administration of justice ceased to function effectively, he argued, it would be better "to institute another form of administration of justice properly recognized and well tried in the shape of the Court Martial procedure, rather than to introduce under civil forms a more drastic procedure than the existing one, which might hardly be consonant with civil idea^.""^ The Government of India, however, rejected the proposals on the grounds that they would place an "unreasonable responsibility" on the military officers serving on tribunals and create general hostility among nationalists toward the Indian Army. The government feared both a retaliatory outrage against soldiers and a subsequent retaliation by the military. Anderson acknowledged that the proposals were not an "ideal solution" but argued that they were the only practical way of dealing with a situation in which the judiciary in Bengal were thoroughly cowed by the threat of terrorist violence. "I have seen the same system working, and working successfully under not dissimilar conditions in Ireland," Anderson wrote. "Martial law in Ireland was not a success, but the courts martial system worked well." l l E
In two other respects, however, Anderson successfully applied his Irish experience to the question of "Bengali terrorism." First, Anderson firmly opposed a policy of reprisals, in spite of pressure from both members of the Government of Bengal and the British community in Calcutta. The assassination of a number of British policemen, district magistrates, and businessmen in the early 1930s generated increased pressure from both the European community and within the Government of Bengal for drastic measures.l19 Government of Bengal officials made explicit refer-ences to the Anglo-Irish War in calling for reprisals. R. E. A. Ray noted that "during the [Irish] Rebellion hostages were shot in retaliation for outrages" and that similar action should be carried out against "hostages" at a detention camp for revolutionaries. R. N. Reid, the chief secretary, argued that "it would be easy to announce that for every Government official killed 3 or 4 or 5 or any number which Government thought suitable to the occasion, would be taken out and shot."120 Anderson, however, was strongly opposed to reprisals, and he used his influence to ensure that no such policy was adopted. The repeated demands of one member of the Bengal Government for such measures prompted Anderson to give a "lucid and comprehensive" discourse on the subject. "He drew on his Irish experience," R. N. Reid recalled, "to prove that reprisals were what was publicly remembered, not the outrages that provoked them.' '12'
The final component of Anderson's Irish experience that influenced the campaign against terrorism was the use of military forces. Although there was never any question of relinquishing control of the Bengal administration to the military, Anderson made a concerted effort to increase military involvement in police operations against terrorists in Benga1.122 One of his first decisions was to enlist the Army's help in boosting the morale of the civil administration in Bengal, and seven battalions of British and Indian troops were distributed over the province. More ambitiously, Anderson incorporated military officers into the civil administration. At Anderson's request, General Sir Norman Macmullen was appointed in 1932 as a liaison officer to the Government of Bengal. Anderson also provided the impetus for the recruitment of military officers into the Intelligence Branch of the Bengal police. Three officers were initially appointed, and the number was later increased to t~e 1 v e . l~~ These Military Intelligence Officers (MIOs) served as plainclothes inspectors in the Intelligence Branch and coordinated the use of military forces in search operations for terrorist suspects. Although most of the sustained.'29 Furthermore, as this article has demonstrated, these IrishIndian analogies had an impact on policy. John Anderson and other British officials did not equate the situation in Bengal with that of Ireland following the First World War, but they did recognize the utility of the Irish example in the attempt to suppress Bengali "terrorism." Although Ireland had been a model for British imperial policy in areas such as land tenure and policing in the nineteenth century, in the twentieth century it provided new lessons in counterinsurgency, as Ireland seemed to hold out models for how to neutralize "Bengali terrorism." The appointment of John Anderson as governor of Bengal was itself a symbolic linkage between "terrorism" in Ireland and Bengal, and he actively attempted to draw on the lessons of the Anglo-Irish War in suppressing terrorism in Bengal, most successfully through the use of the military to supplement the intelligence apparatus of the Bengal police.
One of the great ironies of the impact of Ireland upon Bengali revolutionary movement was that the acknowledged "British" expert on "Bengali terrorism," Sir Charles Tegart of the Indian police, was himself an Irishman. At the same time as Bengali revolutionaries were avidly reading Dan Breen, their primary target for assassination was Tegart, who survived numerous attempts on his life while police commissioner of Calcutta from 1923 to 1931.130 Prior to 1921, the experience of Ireland within the British Empire was both imperial and colonial, and the role of Irishmen as imperial servants in India had been particularly prominent. This imperial role of Irishmen continued after 1921, as Tegart's career demonstrates. In a 1924 speech to the Friends of Freedom for India in New York, Sean T. O'Ceallaigh felt obliged to acknowledge this "deep debt" he believed that the Irish owed to Indian nationalists on account of their service on behalf of the British Empire. It was "largely by the work of Irish brains and Irish brawn and muscle," O'Ceallaigh asserted, that the people of India "have been beaten into subjection and have been so long oppressed. Until Ireland has taken some very definite steps to win back her good name and relieve herself of the odium that attaches to the race by reason of scandalous work done for England's benefit in
